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Abstract: Inequality poses one of the biggest challenges of our time. It is not self-correcting in the
sense that citizens demand more redistributive measures in light of rising inequality, which recent
studies suggest may be due to the fact that citizens’ perceptions of inequality diverge from objective
levels. Moreover, it is not the latter, but the former, which are related to preferences conducive to
redistribution. However, the nascent literature on inequality perceptions has, so far, not accounted
for the role of subjective position in society. The paper advances the argument that the relationship
between inequality perceptions and preferences towards redistribution is conditional on the subjective
position of respondents. To that end, I analyze comprehensive survey data on inequality perceptions
from the social inequality module of the International Social Survey Programme (1992, 1999, and 2009).
Results show that inequality perceptions are associated with preferences conducive to redistribution
particularly among those perceived to be at the top of the social ladder. Gaining a better understanding
of inequality perceptions contributes to comprehending the absence self-correcting inequality.
Keywords: inequality; perceptions; redistribution; social rank; system justification
1. Introduction
Rising inequality poses one of the biggest challenges of our time. Skewed distributions of
resources within societies have been made responsible for a range of political and social issues.
Yet, rising levels of inequality have not increased public demand for redistributive measures [1], as the
political economy literature would suggest [2]. As Dahl [3] (p. 95) pointed out, however: “Between
a condition of objective inequality and the response of a disadvantaged person lie the perceptions,
evaluations, expectations—in short, the psyche of the individual.” So, it should not come as too much
of a surprise that the nascent literature on inequality perceptions casts doubt on citizens’ knowledge
about the level of inequality in their respective country [3–9].
In fact, subjective perceptions of inequality seem to be related to preferences, which are conducive
to redistribution [10–17]. I believe this perception based argumentation needs to be qualified as it
fails to acknowledge the role of the subjective position within society [18–20]. Therefore, this paper
advances the argument that the relationship between inequality perceptions and preferences conducive
to redistribution is conditional on the subjective position of respondents. In particular, I juxtapose two
hypotheses. The first assumes economic self-interest and expects an amplifying interaction, the second
assumes system justification and expects a weakening interaction.
To test this conditional argument, I make use of measures of inequality perceptions in the social
inequality module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which has been administered
in 1992, 1999, and 2009. Merging these individual survey data with Solt’s Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) [21], I first corroborate findings that perceptions of inequality
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are unrelated to income inequality and also vary substantially in one and the same society. Second,
I find that subjective position in society significantly moderates the relationship between inequality
perceptions and preferences for redistribution.
By gaining a better understanding of inequality perceptions, the paper contributes to
comprehending the link between the contextual characteristic of inequality and individual preferences.
The findings further emphasize the need to take individual (mis)perceptions and psychological
processes explicitly into account. Otherwise, any theoretical argument about political consequences
of macro-level phenomena, based on the assumption of correct perceptions, may prove to be
oversimplified and underspecified. On the practical side, the findings might offer implications for
policy-making and the political process in general.
2. Theoretical Background
For any contextual characteristic to explain social phenomena there must be an explicit, empirically
testable argument via the “units at a level below that of the system” [22] (p. 2). Yet, many
arguments about inequality merely assume that the, by definition, macro-level characteristic directly
connects to the micro-level of individual preferences. The Meltzer-Richards-hypothesis, for instance,
implies greater support for redistribution in the face of inequality as the median voter benefits
from redistribution [2]. While this hypothesis has been contested empirically, more recent analyses
indicate that, particularly within countries, greater inequality is indeed linked to stronger demand for
redistribution among median voters [23,24]. But in order to develop greater demand for redistribution,
it is arguably necessary that citizens perceive greater inequality. In most analyses of preferences of the
median voter, this remains a potentially oversimplifying assumption [12] (p. 30). According to Dahl’s
path from the existence of objective inequality to the individual response, consequences of inequality
involving human behavior depend on “perceptions, evaluations, expectations—in short, the psyche of
the individual” [25] (p. 95).
This distinction becomes particularly significant as individuals are found to widely misperceive
objective inequality [3–9]. In the absence of accurate knowledge of inequality, individuals resort to
heuristics, which are prone to bias [26]. Kelley and Evans propose that individuals blend what they
see through their materialist filter with generalizations from reference groups [27]. When people apply
a representativeness heuristic, erroneously assuming their social environment was representative of
the society, they commit to extension neglect [28]. Inferring the level of inequality from the immediate
social environment is biased not only because individuals sort themselves into homogenous groups
in terms of wealth and status [29,30]. Even without self-selection, the mean of any sub-sample of
the highly skewed income distribution will be a biased estimator for the society as a whole. In sum,
diverging perceptions from objective inequality might result from individuals’ failure to deal with the
concept of variance [8], to evaluate the degree of inequality in relation to other countries or previous
levels, and to assess their society as a whole beyond their immediate surroundings [10].
In light of these challenges, we need to reconsider arguments about political preferences conducive
to redistribution. With perceptions being independent from objective inequality, there is little reason to
expect citizens in objectively more unequal societies to form attitudes that would result in redistributive
efforts. However, if citizens perceive the social context to be unequal, they are likely to suffer from
relative deprivation and stress [31]. To amend this situation, they are more susceptible to demand
equality. Thus, evidence in favor of the Meltzer-Richards-hypothesis can be found when it is based
on perceived rather than on objective inequality [11–15,17]. Consequently, I expect perceptions of
more unequal societies to be associated with preferring more income equality, demanding government
intervention to reduce differences in incomes, losing faith in meritocracy, and supporting more
progressive taxation. All these attitudes are not only vital to eventually achieve redistribution
democratically, but they also imply increasing degrees of responsibility. Whereas the former two
merely express a general position and put responsibility on the government, believing in meritocracy
and, particularly, supporting progressive taxation entail a stronger, personal component implying
Societies 2018, 8, 99 3 of 14
willingness to sacrifice their achievements in order to address inequality. This becomes important as
the following argumentation draws on the individual situation of citizens.
Going beyond previous analyses, I advance the conditional argument that relationships between
perceptions and attitudes conducive to redistribution depend on the perceived societal position of a
given individual. Social status itself is, of course, an important determinant of political behavior [20].
Again, subjective perception of status is only loosely correlated with objective measures [32,33], with a
strong tendency to place oneself in the middle of the social hierarchy [30], and it is the former that
shapes political preferences [18,34]. Since greater inequality implies greater differences in social status,
it stands to reason that perceived inequality matters differently for citizens on who perceive themselves
on different rungs of the social ladder. Jazmin, Kristjen, and Stephanie [19] (p. 259) note in this regard,
“little research has investigated the psychological mechanisms that may result from the interaction
between inequality and SES to explain their joint impact on political attitudes and behavior”.
Theoretically, two opposite interactions are conceivable. On the one hand, perceiving greater
inequality could be associated even more strongly with preferences conducive to redistribution for
those who feel to be at the bottom of society, because they would benefit most in financial terms. Equally,
if those at the top perceive society to be unequal, supporting redistribution would be against their own
economic interest. This leads to the hypothesis that the association between inequality perceptions
and preferences conducive to redistribution is positive and stronger, the lower the perceived societal
position. Evidently, this reasoning is based on a rational-choice conception of redistributive preferences.
Similar to the reasoning behind the Meltzer-Richards-hypothesis, it eventually implies a self-correcting
mechanism. If enough citizens perceive society to be unequal and themselves to be at the lower
rungs of the social ladder, they hold preferences, which demand more redistribution. Given the
self-interest maximizing nature, the hypothesis presumably applies to those preferences in particular
that imply more self-responsibility (such as progressive taxation and meritocracy) as opposed to a
general position that does not imply one’s immediate contribution (such as government intervention
and preferring equality).
On the other hand, research on psychological processes behind inequality and social status point to
more intricate mechanisms than selfish, economic self-interest. For instance, it shows that inequality does
not make the “have-nots” more likely to be conscious about their class belonging (only the “haves” less
likely) [35]. An explanation for this can be provided by system justification theory [36,37], according to which
individuals adopt motivated cognition, lending support and justification for the social arrangement, even if
they are disadvantaged by it. Dissonance theory furthermore argues that the disadvantaged, rationalizing
the status quo, should commit to the very causes of their circumstances. It provides support for this
counter-intuitive phenomenon: Individuals who perceive larger income differences in their society are more
likely to praise them as legitimate [38]. The hypothesis by [39] (p. 123), that “[s]ystem justification levels
will be higher in societies in which social and economic inequality is more extreme rather than less extreme”
would thus suggest an alternative interaction. This leads to the hypothesis that those who feel to be at the
bottom of society experience a greater need to reduce cognitive dissonance, resulting in a weaker association
between perceiving high inequality and expressing preferences conducive to redistribution. I moreover
hypothesize that this applies rather to those preferences that imply little contribution (such as government
intervention and preferring equality) and less to those that imply effort and self-responsibility (such as
progressive taxation and meritocracy).
3. Data and Research Design
Attempts to measure perceptions of inequality in a comparative manner are rather rare. One
valuable exception can be found in the social inequality module of the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP), which has been administered in several countries across the world in 1992, 1999, and
2009 (The module in the 1987 wave does not include the item used to measure inequality perceptions).
Respondents are asked to indicate which out of five diagrams best describes the situation in their
country. Based on the presentation in [16] (p. 3), Figure 1 reproduces the question. The five diagrams
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from which respondents could choose are sorted from the most unequal society (Type A) to the
most equal (Type E). Compared to other attempts, this way is the “most appropriate method to
measure how individuals perceive income inequality” [40]. After all, it does not require citizens to
have an understanding of how variance of a distribution translates into a number, but provides a
straightforward assessment encompassing a comprehensive conceptualization of inequality.
This subjective measure of perception is contrasted with objective measures of income inequality
from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by [21]. The SWIID does not only
comprise Gini estimates for many country-years by incorporating several data sources, but also allows
taking measurement uncertainty into account by multiply imputing values. Figure 1 shows how
perceptions of inequality are distributed across all country-years in the sample ranked according to
their Gini coefficients of income inequality after taxes and transfers (Gini net) expressed as a percentage
shown in far right column. Evidently, respondents in all country-years express varying perceptions
about how unequal their society is regardless of the objective level of inequality. That is true both
between, as well as within countries. For instance, respondents in Slovenia, Slovakia or the Czech
Republic perceive inequality strikingly similar to respondents in the U. S. or Israel although the former
are among the most equal countries, while the latter are among the most unequal. And although
inequality has risen considerably in many countries, such as in Latvia or Bulgaria, between 1999 and
2009, perceptions of inequality have remained astonishingly the same. In Australia people seem to
perceive society to be more equal although income inequality has slightly risen.
Further analyses (not shown) scrutinize the independence of subjective perceptions from objective
inequality by regressing various operationalizations of inequality on the perception variable: Change
of Gini net from the last year, mean of Gini net over time, change of Gini net from its mean over time,
and income inequality before taxes and transfers (Gini market). None of these inequality indicators is
significantly associated with perceptions of inequality. Neither do respondents systematically over-nor
underestimate inequality (cf. [3,5,9]), underscoring that their perceptions are simply independent from
any objective measure of inequality.
In the following section, I test the hypotheses using multilevel modelling, due to the hierarchic
data structure. These models allow for varying-slopes for inequality perceptions and include three
levels with individual observations nested in 69 country-years, which are, in turn, nested in 27 countries.
Furthermore, we include several control variables that have shown to be important for redistributive
preferences and have been held constant in previous analyses (e.g., [12,14,14,17,23]). On the individual
level, I am careful to include only controls that precede the explanatory variable [41] (p. 188), and hold
perceived position in society, age, age squared, sex, and level of education constant. On the contextual
level, the sample comprises a rather diverse set of countries. Since idiosyncrasies in terms of economic
and political development potentially bias inequality perceptions between countries, I control for a
country’s income inequality after taxes and transfers, its level of democracy, its human capital (average
years of schooling and rate of return to education), and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Measures are taken from Solt’s SWIID [21], Polity IV, and Penn World Table [42], respectively.
Regarding preferences relevant for redistribution, I consider the following dependent variables:
Preferring income equality, demanding government intervention, believing in meritocracy, and
supporting progressive taxation. To test the argument about a conditional relationship, a multiplicative
interaction term between inequality perception and perceived societal position is included. Appendix A
lists the items as they were asked in the ISSP surveys for all dependent and constitutive variables.
In order to deal with missing values, I apply multiple imputation. The final data consists of
ten data sets each representing a (randomly drawn) multiple imputation of the SWIID values joined
with imputed ISSP values for 88,167 respondents. Accordingly, I compute each model for each of the
ten data sets and report the average of estimates. Since the imputation model produces continuous
values [43] (p. 850), I estimate linear models. This also facilitates model convergence and interpretation.
Still, results are the same when estimating ordered logit models or (binary) logit models with various
splits instead.
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Figure 1. Distributions of income perceptions across countries. Black circles represent means per
country-year. Country-years sorted by Gini net according to [21] expressed as a percentage shown in
far right column. Note: Figure 1 is inspired by the presentation in [16], Data and question based on
Q14 in ISSP 1992, 1999, 2009.
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4. Results
Figure 2 presents results of multilevel regression models for the four preferences relevant for
redistribution, including an interaction term of inequality perceptions and social status. Regression
tables and models without interaction terms can be found in Appendix B (Table A1) and Appendix C
(Figure A1), respectively. Concerning coefficients of the constitutive terms, inequality perceptions are
significantly related to preferences. People who perceive their society to be more unequal also think
income differences are too large, it’s the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences,
hard work is not important to get ahead in life, and the rich should pay a larger share of their income
in taxes. Due to the interaction term, these interpretations apply when the standardized variable for
subjective social status is zero (i.e., at the mean value of subjective social status). Models without
the interaction term (reported in Appendix C) show the same relationships. Interestingly, objective
inequality is not associated with preferences in the same way. Coefficients of the standardized Gini
coefficient after taxes and transfers are smaller and the standard errors so large that they include zero
in three out of four models.
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The finding that perceptions of inequality, and not objective levels, predict preferences relevant
for redistribution is much in line with recent research [10–17]. Emphasizing the necessity to take
psychological processes on the individual level into account, it can serve as explanation why
inequality is not self-correcting as the Meltzer-Richards-hypothesis suggests. But in how far are
these relationships, as previously argued, conditional on perceived social status? Coefficients of the
interaction terms in Figure 2 are somewhat ambiguous. In two of the four models, coefficients do
not reach statistical significance. For preferences implying self-responsibility and effort, interactions
indicate that the relationships do not differ according to social status. For inequality preference
and government responsibility, on the other hand, the coefficients indicate a significant moderation.
To evaluate the conditionality for these dependent variables further, Figure 3 illustrates marginal
coefficients conditional on subjective social status (on the x-axis). The range of the x-axis is limited to
the range of the standardized variable in the ISSP data before imputation.
Rather steep slopes in the left panels (and to some degree in the upper right panel) of Figure 3
confirm that relationships between inequality perceptions and those political preferences depend on
where in society a respondent ranks herself. In contrast, more progressive taxation is preferred by
citizens of all ranks if they perceive society to be unequal. The results also provide an answer to the
direction of the interaction. It is, notably, not the case that a subjectively deprived situation amplifies
the association. Rather, it applies to those who rank themselves at the top as they favor more income
equality and government intervention, and also believe less in meritocracy. For those at the bottom,
in contrast, these associations are substantially weaker. While the x-axis in Figure 3 shows only the
range of the original, un-imputed variable, the associations become even statistically insignificant
when estimated for extremely low imputed values of subjective status (i.e., below −2.2025). That is
striking because they would have the most to gain from redistributive efforts. Therefore, the finding
might make more sense as evidence of system justification and dissonance theory [36,37]. Individuals
who feel disadvantaged and perceive society as unequal rationalize the situation and lend support to
the social arrangement in so far as they do not demand change in form of redistribution [39] (p. 123).
I return to discussing further implications of this finding in the concluding section.
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5. Conclusions
In 2004, the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy [44] (p. 661), recognizing
the perils of growing inequalities, called for more research into “changing economic inequality and
changes in political behavior”. But in light of recent findings univocally demonstrating the mismatch
between individual perceptions of inequality and actual, objective levels [3–17], it seems warranted
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to further scrutinize the relationships between inequality perceptions and preferences conducive
to redistribution.
The results corroborate the fact that people perceive inequality differently from the actual
level. Explicitly examining the link between a macro-level phenomenon and individual behavior
has important implications with particular relevance in the political realm where many theories
naturally relate societal conditions with political behavior. For instance, it cites Marx’s thesis that
workers faced with inequalities should “unite and overthrow the rich” [45] (p. 125). Marx’s prediction
not coming true despite rising inequality might be due to the fact that individuals do not perceive
inequality as it is. Hence, it should come as anything but a surprise that inequality does not have
the supposed consequences for politics. The analysis of survey data from the ISSP adds to the
literature by showing that the relationship between inequality perceptions and preferences concerning
redistribution particularly apply to those who believe to be at the top of society, and not to those who
would actually benefit from more redistribution. Notably, this applies to general positions towards
redistribution, but not to support for more progressive taxation, which implies that those who perceive
to be at the top would actually have to make an effort in paying more taxes.
Perhaps most importantly, it sheds further light on why inequality is not only not decreasing, but
in fact increasing in many countries. In addition to flaws and shortcomings of democratic systems not
being able to fully translate political preferences of the majority into policies [46], citizens apparently
do not hold preferences that would be beneficial to them in the first place. Instead, the formation
of preferences happens more intricately achieving psychosocial aims like system justification and
dissonance reduction. As a concrete consequence, public opinion on tax cuts is often ill-informed
and independent from relevant values and material interests [47]. This logic does not only apply to
inequality. In many domains, researchers have recently pointed out diverging trends between objective
measures and subjective perception: Crime rates [48], violence [49], democratic governance [50],
happiness [51], and other social domains, such as health, employment, security, and social ranking [52].
For the functioning of democracy, this divide is crucial. Voters mandate politicians to change objective
measures according to their preferences. Politicians, however, have an incentive to rather influence
perceptions of voters—because this is what gets them elected.
These implications suggest at least five avenues for further research. First, the finding that
inequality perceptions seem to be independent of objective levels begs the question on what basis
inequality perceptions are formed in the first place. Further scrutiny is needed to compare and explain
differences in inequality perceptions. Possible starting points could be socialization and personal
experiences or party attachment. Second, it seems fruitful to test perceptions of inequality in other
instances as well, since inequality is usually made responsible for a whole range of social issues,
including well-being, tolerance, social trust, and happiness. Second, as inequality is only one (albeit
a crucial) condition of society, it would make sense to apply the argument to other instances where
perceptions probably deviate from objective levels. If appropriate measures are available, it can be
tested, for instance, whether perceptions of crime rates and violence instead of official numbers are
associated with individual behavior. Third, this study, relying on correlations of individual responses,
is unable to assess the causality between inequality perceptions and political behavior. While my
focus is rather, among which respondents there is an association, it would be interesting to gather
experimental data. For example, experiments could answer which treatments affect perception of
inequality and how large the causal effect of treated perceptions on political behavior is. Finally,
the question remains if and how perceptions of inequality result in policy measures targeting, and
eventually reducing, inequality. Are exaggerated perceptions in the public necessary for to the
introduction of policy instruments adopted to counter inequality? I hope this study can serve as
inspiration and point of departure for further research into these questions.
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Appendix A
ISSP items used for operationalization of constitutive and dependent variables from modules
Social Inequality and Citizenship
Perceived Social Position
In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be
towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself
now on this scale?
Inequality Perception
These five diagrams show different types of society. Please read the descriptions and look at the
diagrams and decide which you think best describes your country.
Inequality Preference
Differences in income in your country are too large.
Government Responsibility
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with
high incomes and those with low incomes.
Meritocratic Beliefs
Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in
life: How important is hard work?
Progressive Taxation
Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than
those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?
Appendix B
Table A1. Regression tables from varying-intercept, varying-slope models of political preferences.
Inequality Preference Government Responsibility Meritocratic Beliefs Progressive Taxation
Gini net (std) −0.01 −0.05 0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Subjective status (std) −0.10 −0.13 0.04 −0.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inequality perception (std) 0.10 0.09 −0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age/10 0.10 0.04 −0.02 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age/10 (squared) −0.01 −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sex 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Education −0.02 −0.07 0.02 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p/c (std) 0.02 0.01 −0.05 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Human capital (std) −0.01 −0.09 −0.00 −0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Polity IV (std) −0.04 −0.03 0.05 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Interaction term 0.03 0.02 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intercept 3.96 3.83 3.95 3.81
Country-year intercept 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Country-year slope 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Country intercept 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01
Country slope 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00
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Table A1. Cont.
Inequality Preference Government Responsibility Meritocratic Beliefs Progressive Taxation
AIC 199,403 234,585 210,536 190,121
BIC 199,581 234,763 210,714 190,299
Note: Data from ISSP waves 1992, 1999, 2009. Estimates are based on 88167 individual observations in 69
country-years in 27 countries. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses), and model parameters are averaged
over 10 multiply imputed data sets. Standardized variables are marked with (std). Varying-slopes are estimated for
inequality perceptions (std).
Appendix C
Coefficient plots from varying-intercept, varying-slope models of political preferences without
interaction terms.
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